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BANKING, FINANCIAL INTEGRATION,
AND INTERNATIONAL CRISES: AN OVERVIEW
Leonardo Hernández Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
International Monetary Fund Banco Central de Chile
Resumen
Este trabajo sintetiza recientes investigaciones sobre la relación entre instituciones, desarrollo
financiero, crecimiento económico, integración financiera, y la probabilidad de ciclos auge-declive
y crisis bancarias. La primera parte del trabajo revisa temas relacionados principalmente al sector
bancario y resume nuevos hallazgos concernientes a la regulación y supervisión bancaria y al
comportamiento de los depositantes y otros agentes de mercado. Nuevos hallazgos sobre
internacionalización de la banca, ciclos de auge y declive y vínculos macrofinancieros durante la
integración financiera, elementos de las crisis financieras internacionales, y el rol de los controles
de capitales para reducir la vulnerabilidad macroeconómica, son revisados en la segunda parte del
trabajo.
Abstract
This paper summarizes new research on the relationship among institutions, financial development,
economic growth, financial integration, and the likelihood of boom-bust cycles and banking crises.
The first part of the paper reviews issues pertaining mainly to the banking sector, and summarizes
new findings regarding banking regulation and supervision and the behavior of depositors and
other market participants. New findings on the internationalization of banking, boom-bust cycles
and macro-financial linkages during financial integration, the elements of international financial
crises, and the role of capital controls to reduce macroeconomic vulnerability are reviewed in the
second part of the paper.
_____________________
This paper is the overview chapter of the forthcoming book Banking, Financial Integration, and
International Crises, edited by Leonardo Hernández and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Banco Central de
Chile, Santiago, 2002. E-mail: lhernandez3@imf.org.Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises
1
The devaluation of the Thai baht in July 1997 triggered a major
international financial crisis in East Asia, similar in many ways to
the Latin American debt crisis of the early 1980s. The baht's devalu-
ation led to a series of sharp devaluations in several other Asian coun-
tries, in particular Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines.
The Russian debt moratorium and the Long Term Capital Manage-
ment crisis in 1998, and the devaluation of the Brazilian real in early
1999, sent additional shock waves throughout the world's emerging
markets. In each of these episodes, strong market pressures were
observed in currency and debt markets. Although most emerging mar-
ket economies faced contagion effects, the weakest countries—those
with fragile domestic banks, large fiscal deficits and external debts,
severe currency and maturity mismatches, poor macroeconomic poli-
cies, and more rigid foreign exchange regimes—were most affected
by the loss of investor confidence. These countries suffered some com-
bination of lack of access to international liquidity, currency devalu-
ation, asset price collapse, bank failures, recession, and large-scale
bankruptcies and unemployment.
After the storm, however, relative calm returned to international
financial markets in 1999, and East Asia started to recover vigor-
ously. During 2000-01, major new crises were avoided in Ecuador,
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Argentina, and Turkey only by last-minute massive provision of emer-
gency liquidity by the multilateral financial institutions.
The Asian crisis, together with its aftershocks, has changed our
understanding of how international financial markets operate. It has
shed some light on the policies that countries should adopt to better
face adverse shocks and contagion effects, and on the measures that
should be promoted to reshape the international financial architec-
ture so as to reduce contagion. Much new theoretical, empirical, and
policy research has had the recent international financial turmoil as
its focus. Among the major research issues are the market and in-
centive structures of banks and their supervision and regulation; the
interplay of banks, foreign creditors, nonfinancial firms, and the gov-
ernment when moral hazard is widespread; the interrelationships
among institutions, financial development, and growth; the macro-
economic aspects of overlending and overborrowing, and of high vola-
tility in asset prices and exchange rates; the optimal degree and pace
of financial integration into world capital markets when contagion is
a threat; and new policies to reduce the likelihood of losses of confi-
dence in domestic and international financial markets.
This book seeks to contribute to the literature by publishing new
and relevant research on banking, financial integration, and interna-
tional crises, providing answers to old and new questions in the light
of the recent experience of international financial turmoil. Most of
the papers published in this volume are substantially revised ver-
sions of papers presented at the Second Annual Conference of the
Central Bank of Chile on “Financial Integration, Banking Systems,
and Macroeconomic Stability,” held in Santiago in September 1998.
This overview reviews the issues addressed in the various pa-
pers. The first section analyzes new research on the relationships
among institutions, financial development, growth, and the likelihood
of banking crises. Section 2 reviews issues in the banking sector, and
in particular some new findings regarding bank regulation and su-
pervision and the behavior of bank market participants. The inter-
face between macroeconomic and financial variables during booms
and busts is taken up in section 3, with a focus on credit booms, asset
price bubbles and busts, and the behavior of exchange rates after
financial crises. New findings on banking internationalization, over-
all financial integration, the elements of international financial cri-
ses, capital controls to stem inflows, and components of an interna-
tional safety net are reviewed in section 4. The overview concludes
and identifies some lessons for policy in section 5.Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises
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1. INSTITUTIONS, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT, GROWTH,
AND BANKING CRISES
Legal and political institutions are crucial for financial develop-
ment, and financial development in turn is important for rapid eco-
nomic growth. Political conditions also affect the likelihood of bank-
ing crises. New research adds significantly to the stock of knowledge
on these relationships.
1.1 Determinants of Financial Development
and Growth
The legal systems of emerging market countries are of differing
national origins, and these differences tend to result in different types
of laws, regulations, and legal enforcement mechanisms. Recent re-
search shows that the development and efficiency of a country's fi-
nancial markets depend ultimately on what kind of institutional and
legal framework prevails in the country (Laporta and others, 1998).
Financial markets develop best where there is protection of creditor
rights, compliance with the law, an effective and efficient judiciary
system, stringent disclosure requirements on firms, compliance with
international accounting standards, a multiplicity of entities involved
in the political process, and relatively little government corruption.
It has also been observed for years that financial development
and economic growth are highly correlated. However, it was not un-
til recently that causality could be established between these two
forces. King and Levine (1993) and Levine and Zervos (1998), among
others, show that the degree of financial development helps explain
long-run growth (for a survey see Levine, 1997). A more developed
financial sector intermediates funds more efficiently, promotes tech-
nological innovation, diversifies risks, and exerts corporate gover-
nance more effectively, ultimately leading to more capital accumula-
tion in more profitable and less risky investment projects.
The paper in this volume by Ross Levine, Norman Loayza, and
Thorsten Beck is an important complement to these findings.
The authors show that countries whose laws give a high priority to
secured creditors, whose legal systems rigorously enforce contracts,
and whose accounting standards produce high-quality financial state-
ments tend to have better financial intermediaries. They also review
the earlier findings of King and Levine. Using a larger sample ofLeonardo Hernández and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
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countries and more advanced econometric techniques, they find that
a more developed and efficient financial system allows countries to
achieve faster growth. And they conclude that this effect is large.
According to their estimates, an economy with a level of financial
intermediation reflected by a private credit ratio to GDP of 18 per-
cent on average during 1960-95 would have experienced annual growth
of GDP that was 1 percentage point faster than an economy with a
level of private credit of only 12 percent of GDP.
1.2 Political Institutions and Banking Crises
A large number of financial crises—most of them banking crises
—have hit both developing and industrial countries during the last
quarter century, from Argentina and Mexico to Korea and Thailand,
and from India and Russia to Japan and the United States. These
crises have spawned much research attempting to document their
characteristics and explain their causes and consequences.1 A num-
ber of factors—foreign overborrowing by banks, excessive private sec-
tor credit growth, adverse terms-of-trade shocks, inflation, large fis-
cal deficits, high interest rates, low income levels and growth rates
—have been found to be significantly associated with, or to contrib-
ute to, the likelihood of banking crises. Weak institutions and inef-
fective regulations are typically found to be the factors underpinning
such developments as excessive credit growth and skyrocketing in-
terest rates. Inadequate banking regulation and supervision, rapid
financial liberalization in the absence of sound regulation and super-
vision, explicit but underfunded deposit insurance, implicit govern-
ment bailout guarantees to bank depositors and owners, the pres-
ence of large state banks, and a lack of bank competition contribute
to inefficient management and moral hazard in banking, and have
indeed been associated with subsequent financial crises.
Philip Keefer's paper in this volume extends previous research
on this topic by focusing on political conditions that contribute to the
likelihood of systemic bank failure. His cross-country findings show
that the extent of government checks and balances—measured by
the extent to which the executive branch of government is constrained
1. See Caprio (1998), Caprio and Klingebiel (1997), Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detriagache (1997, 1998), Goldstein and Turner (1996), and Radelet and Sachs
(1998), among others.Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises
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by party fractionalization—affects the probability with which banking
crises occur in two ways. First, high fractionalization may directly
influence the magnitude and probability of a crisis through its effect
on intragovernmental negotiation costs, which in turn slow the re-
sponse to an incipient crisis. The second effect is indirect, by chang-
ing the influence of other banking crisis determinants. In a country
where checks and balances are few or absent, the probability that,
say, an unfavorable terms-of-trade shock will cause a banking crisis
is higher than in a country with extensive checks and balances. The
same is true of other banking crisis determinants, such as low cash
reserves, a large volume of outstanding credit to the private sector,
and extensive deposit insurance. All these can trigger crises in coun-
tries where checks and balances are weak, as governments can more
easily shift the costs of financial crises onto unrepresented sectors of
society.
2. REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF BANKS AND
DEPOSITOR BEHAVIOR
Many countries can significantly improve upon their existing fi-
nancial systems. There is wide consensus that inappropriate regula-
tions and supervisory standards not only retard economic growth but
also increase the probability of a financial crisis that could spread
beyond the country's own borders. In response to a rising incidence
of banking crises, the multilateral financial institutions are vigor-
ously urging countries to implement appropriate regulations and su-
pervisory practices for their financial sectors.
In 1988 the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision introduced
international guidelines for the determination of bank capital require-
ments. The Basle guidelines required a minimum risk-weighted capi-
tal-asset ratio of 8 percent but considered only credit risk in the cal-
culation of risk. Although these guidelines were meant for interna-
tionally active banks, they have increasingly been adopted by banks
in developing countries. Recently, the Basle Committee issued new
guidelines considering market and operational as well as credit risks,
and allowing for a more flexible approach in determining bank
2. For the new guidelines see www.bis.org/publ/bcbsa.htm.Leonardo Hernández and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
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minimum capital requirements.2 The new guidelines, expected to be
fully implemented by 2004, depart from the 1988 version by relying
more on market assessment and handling of risks.
New empirical research explores three questions relating to bank
regulation, supervision, and risk. First, how do political institutions,
banking regulation, banking performance, and crises interact? Sec-
ond, how might market-based mechanisms complement rule-based
banking supervision? Finally, do market participants (both bank de-
positors and interbank lenders) take banks' underlying risks into ac-
count in their transactions?
2.1 Prudential Regulation and Bank Performance
Despite widespread agreement on the need for financial reform,
there is little empirical evidence to support any concrete advice re-
garding either specific or comprehensive regulatory or supervisory
norms and regulations. The reason is that detailed cross-country com-
parisons of financial systems for developing countries have until re-
cently been unavailable. James Barth, Gerard Caprio, Jr., and Ross
Levine, in this volume, make use of a new data set covering about
fifty countries to examine empirically the relationships among regu-
latory, government, and financial variables.
The authors report three main empirical results. First, countries
whose governments are more bureaucratic, corrupt, and prone to
breach traditions of law and order tend to impose harsher regulatory
restrictions on nontraditional bank activities. Second, countries with
more restrictions do not necessarily have less poorly functioning bank-
ing systems. Third, and most surprising, in countries with more re-
strictions, the likelihood of a banking crisis is not lower but higher;
this suggests that restricting the ability of banks to diversify increases
their fragility. This finding contradicts the notion that imposing
stricter restrictions on banks' nontraditional activities reduces ex-
cessive risk taking. Two forces may be at work here. First, the more-
diversified banking activities and portfolios that a less restrictive regu-
latory regime allows may reduce bank risk and thus the likelihood of
bank failure. Second, lower restrictions may raise the franchise value
of banks, leading to better bank management and governance, al-
though it complicates bank supervision. Hence this study suggests
that the gains from allowing broader banking activities more than
offset the potential risks and supervisory complications.Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises
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2.2 Rule-Based and Market-Based
Banking Supervision
A standard way of reducing the likelihood of financial crises in
the past has been to put in place one or more of the following: rules
and norms that limit the actions of financial intermediaries3; super-
visory agencies that monitor compliance with such rules and assess
bank solvency; and institutional arrangements (a financial safety net)
that guarantee the continuity of the payments system and avoid li-
quidity and confidence crises.4 But experience has shown that these
three elements require careful design and implementation to avoid
creating new problems and distortions that can lead to the very out-
come they seek to avoid. Such problems arise when restrictions on
financial firms contribute to the emergence of less efficient and usu-
ally less regulated (sometimes informal) financial intermediaries,
when regulatory agencies are unable to keep pace with market de-
velopments and become obsolete (as usually happens),, and when the
safety net intensifies moral hazard problems, leading to unsound bank-
ing practices. Striking a balance between the costs and the benefits
of banking regulation and supervision has proved difficult, especially
in recent years, as the explosive development of communications and
technology has spurred rapid change in the financial services
industry.
In confronting these difficulties and trade-offs, countries may wish
to complement (or even replace) their rule-based bank supervision
with properly designed, market-friendly mechanisms aimed at en-
hancing market discipline. These have the advantage of encouraging
sound banking practices while allowing the industry to follow market
developments and trends more closely. For instance, countries could
replace their state-run deposit insurance agencies with a require-
ment that banks contract for deposit insurance directly with private
providers. At the same time, countries could make greater use of
interbank interest rates to assess individual bank solvency and li-
quidity problems. Also, instead of restricting bank activities, coun-
tries could require banks to subject themselves to periodic risk
assessment by independent rating agencies; the ratings would then
be made public so that depositors become fully aware of banks'
  3. These regulations include minimum liquidity and capitalization require-
ments, portfolio restrictions, and disclosure requirements, among others.
  4. Safety net arrangements comprise lender-of-last-resort and deposit in-
surance schemes.Leonardo Hernández and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
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underlying risks. Requirements of the latter type have been adopted
with great success in recent years by New Zealand and, to a lesser
extent, by Chile. Market-based mechanisms along these lines raise
the effectiveness of the regulatory and supervisory framework and
hence foster market discipline and efficiency.
2.3 Bank Risk and Depositor Behavior
A necessary condition for the success of market-friendly bank
regulation is that market participants be responsive to information
on banks' underlying risks and overall health. What does the evi-
dence about bank depositors and interbank lenders suggest on this
score?
The paper by María Soledad Martínez-Peria and Sergio Schmukler,
in this volume, analyzes two issues related to bank market discipline
as reflected in the behavior of depositors in Argentina, Chile, and
Mexico during the past two decades. First, they examine depositor
behavior and the relationship between market discipline and deposit
insurance. It is shown that depositors both small and large punish
banks for risky behavior, both by withdrawing deposits and by requir-
ing higher interest rates. Insured and uninsured depositors alike
respond to bank risk taking. This result suggests that none of the
deposit insurance schemes in the three countries considered is fully
credible, and it raises doubts about similar schemes in similar
countries.
Next the authors analyze the link between market discipline and
banking crises, showing that large systemic effects take place during
crises, affecting deposits and interest rates across banks regardless
of their fundamentals. Following bank interventions and failures,
depositors become more aware of the risk of losing their deposits,
and therefore they exercise stricter market discipline than before. In
sum, banking crises are a wake-up call for depositors, exerting a
greater impact on their behavior than the introduction of deposit in-
surance systems of dubious credibility.
In a related study in this volume, Antonio Ahumada and Carlos
Budnevich investigate bank riskiness and the behavior of
interbank lenders in Chile. They provide empirical evidence on
nonperforming loans and interbank interest spreads, using monthly
bank-level data for the 1990s. The ratio of nonperforming bank loans
to total loans—a good measure of overall bank fragility—is shown to
decline, after a lag, as bank capital and liquidity ratios rise, andBanking, Financial Integration, and International Crises
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to increase with bank lending growth. The ratio also rises with the
tightness of monetary policy. The results for interbank interest
spreads show that more illiquid banks also pay higher interbank in-
terest rates. Other financial variables (including nonperforming loan
ratios) do not contribute separately and significantly to interbank
spreads.
These two studies thus support the view that interest rates are
responsive to banks' fundamentals, and suggest that bank deposit
rates or interbank lending rates could be used to determine the pre-
miums charged to banks participating in deposit insurance schemes.
In fact, Argentina adopted just such a mechanism in response to con-
tagion from the 1994 Mexican crisis, as a tool for regulating bank
provisioning against bad loans. In particular, the nonperforming loan
provision that banks were required to make for each loan was made
dependent on the loan's interest rate. Since it is in the interest of
each bank to charge a rate proportional to the loan's risk, the new
provision allows Argentinean bank supervisors to rely on each bank's
internal risk assessment instead of having to evaluate each loan di-
rectly.
Hence the recent evidence summarized here suggests important
benefits from complementing conventional, rule-based regulatory
systems with market-based mechanisms designed to enhance mar-
ket discipline and self-regulation. By doing so, supervisors may avoid
some of the dismal consequences of the rapid obsolescence of rule-
based regulatory frameworks that stems from the superior ability of
private agents to keep pace with market developments.
3. LENDING BOOMS, ASSET PRICES, AND
EXCHANGE RATES
We now shift the focus away from banking to consider macroeco-
nomic and macrofinancial issues, and in particular the phenomenon
of lending booms and the behavior of asset prices and exchange rates
during boom-and-bust cycles.
3.1  Lending Booms
Recent evidence suggests that credit booms are partly financed
by large capital inflows and often lead to financial crises (World Bank,
1997, 2001). However, capital inflows may not be the cause but ratherLeonardo Hernández and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
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the consequence of credit booms. In fact, credit booms can be caused
either by domestic changes (such as a financial liberalization) or by
an exogenous shock (such as lower foreign interest rates).
Gourinchas, Valdés, and Landerretche (2001) present empirical
cross-country evidence for 1960-96, showing that financial crises are
more likely after a credit boom has taken place. They also provide
evidence that the dominant forces behind a surge in capital inflows
are domestic (pull) factors, not external (push) factors.
Leonardo Hernández and Oscar Landerretche, in this volume,
also undertake an empirical study of capital flows, lending booms,
and financial crises, focussing more on the role played by the domes-
tic banking system during such cycles. Using a sixty-country sample
over a shorter period (1970-95), they conclude that periods of finan-
cial distress are indeed more likely after a lending boom, but also
that these booms are associated with capital inflows only in the case
of developing countries (which in general have weaker banks). Fur-
thermore, capital inflows are smaller (as a percentage of the recipi-
ent country's GDP) in countries where the lending boom ends in fi-
nancial distress. Hence it appears that international investors put
proportionately more of their capital into countries with financial
systems that are less prone to experience financial crises after lend-
ing booms.
3.2  Asset Prices and Exchange Rates
Overvaluation of assets and an overvalued currency are frequently
the counterparts of domestic and external lending booms. How much
do asset prices and exchange rates diverge from what their funda-
mentals would indicate during boom episodes? How quickly are
overvaluations corrected after a crisis? And what role do policies play
during booms and crashes?
A burgeoning literature has focused on the many factors affecting
asset price bubbles.5 In their study of asset prices in Chile during
1978-98, in this volume, Raphael Bergoeing, Felipe Morandé, and
Raimundo Soto analyze whether the behavior of equity, land,
and real estate prices in that country has been consistent with mar-
ket fundamentals (including policy variables) or with bubbles. Using
5. See Flood and Garber (1980), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1986), Shleifer and
Summers (1990), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Stein (1995), Allen and Gale (1998),
Krugman (1998), and Edison, Pongsack, and Miller (1998).Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises
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long-term cointegration relations for asset prices, the authors find
evidence for temporary bubbles and busts. However, the estimates
from their short-term error correction models show no significant
deviations from fundamentals-driven equilibrium values. They report
that policy variables exert a significant influence on asset prices.
Counterfactual simulations for alternative paths of fiscal policy (pub-
lic expenditure), monetary policy (interest rates), and pension fund
policy (allowing pension funds to invest in equities) show substantial
effects on asset prices in Chile. Surprisingly, no positive and signifi-
cant effects of foreign capital inflows on domestic asset prices are
found by these authors.
The literature on exchange rates has evolved from models of real
and financial determinants of equilibrium rates (see Taylor, 1995, for
a survey) to the study of episodes of substantial disequilibrium (for
example, Goldfajn and Valdés, 1998). Most traditional research has
overwhelmingly rejected the uncovered interest parity condition pro-
posed to relate exchange rate and interest rate differentials (see
Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996, for a review). Rejection of this parity con-
dition or its related forward-market efficiency condition is termed
the exchange rate premium puzzle. However, recent research on in-
dustrial-country exchange rates, based on more flexible specifications
and/or cointegration estimation techniques, provide evidence for a
close long-run relation between exchange rates and interest rates, in
support of the uncovered interest parity condition (Edison and Melick,
1999; MacDonald and Nagayasu, 2000).
Ilan Goldfajn and Poonam Gupta, in this volume, shed new light
on these issues by analyzing a large sample of episodes during 1980-
98 in which sizable real depreciations occurred in the aftermath
of currency crises. They document that the real exchange rate over-
shoots on the down side during a currency crisis and must be brought
back to equilibrium after the crisis subsides. Defining a successful
real appreciation as one that takes place through nominal apprecia-
tion (not domestic inflation), the authors show that, for large real
undervaluations, the probability of success increases significantly
when tight monetary policy (a higher real interest rate) is imple-
mented and the banking system is strong. In contrast, tight mon-
etary policy actually lowers the likelihood of successful real apprecia-
tion when the country is experiencing a "twin" crisis, that is, a cur-
rency crisis and a banking crisis simultaneously. Hence banking
crises may dampen the effect of interest rates on exchange rates.Leonardo Hernández and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
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This result provides new evidence on a variant of the exchange rate-
interest rate parity condition, suggesting that part of the exchange
rate premium puzzle mentioned above may be due to severe banking
problems that hamper the efficient pricing of financial and monetary
assets.
4. BANK INTERNATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL CRISES, CAPITAL CONTROLS, AND AN
INTERNATIONAL SAFETY NET
Opening up domestic banks to foreign competitors is a potentially
important component of international financial integration. Liberal-
ization of the capital account to foreign inflows offers potentially large
efficiency and growth gains but has also frequently led to overbor-
rowing and hence to crises. East Asia suffered from a deep crisis in
the late 1990s while Latin America remained largely unscathed. Care-
ful scrutiny of these and related issues is important before policies
aimed at future crisis prevention are implemented. Possible policy
responses include capital controls (to stem "excessive" capital inflows),
contingent credit lines (to face international liquidity problems), and
elements of a future international safety net.
4.1  Internationalization of Banking
A recent trend toward internationalization of banking can be
observed in some emerging market economies: their domestic finan-
cial markets are becoming increasingly open to entrance by well-
established international banks (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Huizinga, 1998; Clarke and others, 1999; Denizer, 2000). This is partly
prompted by the growing consensus that internationalization of bank-
ing is the most effective way for developing countries to acquire capi-
tal, technology, and managerial skills in banking, all of which many
developing countries now lack. It is argued that internationalization
of banking would allow the introduction of frontier technology and
best practices in project evaluation, risk assessment, and hedging;
would permit better risk diversification; and would increase competi-
tion. All these would lead to more and cheaper financial products. In
addition, because international banks are usually subject to more
stringent regulation than domestic banks, internationalization ofBanking, Financial Integration, and International Crises
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banking should lead to an upgrade in accounting, disclosure, and
transparency standards, improving the regulatory framework in
most developing countries (Claessens and Glaessner, 1998; Dobson,
1998).
A more extreme position argues that internationalization of bank-
ing is desirable because it permits delegating bank supervision and
regulation to the agencies charged with that task in the foreign banks'
home countries. Thus opening local markets to foreign banks means
substituting imported bank supervision and regulation for its domes-
tically produced counterpart (Gavin and Hausmann, 1995). This is
the case, for example, in New Zealand, where most banks are foreign
owned.
Because of its close relation to overall financial integration, in-
ternationalization of banking may also bring benefits in the form of
greater macroeconomic stability. Easing the entrance of foreign banks
into developing countries facilitates those countries' access to world
capital markets. This allows better smoothing of cyclical income fluc-
tuations and reduces the likelihood of a cutoff of foreign financing
due to financial contagion or other international market imperfec-
tions. Finally, internationalization of banking could reduce the cost
of funds, especially to small and medium-size enterprises that cannot
tap international capital markets by issuing equity or bonds abroad.
However, internationalization of banking and financial integra-
tion more broadly are also a source of concern to policymakers, mainly
for three reasons. First, credit markets may become segmented as
foreign banks tend to concentrate their business on the largest and
most creditworthy domestic companies, leaving the riskier projects
and less solvent firms to be financed locally. Second, financial inte-
gration can contribute to economic instability, because foreign capi-
tal, although relatively cheap, is also highly volatile: credit booms,
asset price bubbles, and overborrowing can emerge and lead to a
crisis. Third, in a globally integrated economy it becomes even more
difficult for local authorities to confront and effectively contain a
confidence crisis, whether founded or unfounded, because now for-
eign creditors are involved, and because even domestically owned
funds now have more avenues to flee abroad. Although these con-
cerns are certainly legitimate (and we discuss below how some of
them can be dealt with), international experience suggests that the
potential benefits of integration nevertheless outweigh the potential
costs.Leonardo Hernández and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
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4.2  The Behavior of Foreign Banks
Japanese banks substantially increased their global presence in
the late 1980s through cross-border lending and by opening foreign
subsidiaries. Although their initial focus was on the United States, in
the 1990s their efforts were aggressively redirected to Southeast Asia.
Joe Peek and Eric Rosengren, in this volume, examine Japanese banks'
response to home- and host-country shocks in Southeast Asia, and
show that the pattern of lending and opening of subsidiaries followed
trends in Japan more closely than trends in Southeast Asia. This
behavior, which contrasts with Japanese bank retrenchment with
respect to the United States, Hong Kong, and Singapore,  exerted a
stabilizing influence on the economies affected by the Asian crisis
and is attributed to the banks' aim to maintain a dominant presence
in countries with high long-run profit potential.6 This result is consis-
tent with Hernández and Landerretche's finding that countries suf-
fering from financial distress continue to receive capital inflows (al-
though smaller flows than before the crisis). In other words, financial
crises cannot in general be attributed to capital outflows.7
In sum, from the evidence presented in this volume, it is hard to
argue that foreign banks, or foreign lending more generally, are the
cause of financial distress and instability. Capital flight and crises
tend to occur when domestic investors start fleeing their own
countries, leaving governments liable and imposing losses on foreign
creditors.
4.3  Overborrowing
A valid concern of policymakers in emerging market economies
that liberalize their capital accounts is how to reduce the likelihood
that financial integration will lead to excessive external borrowing,
making the whole economy more vulnerable to shocks. Should
6. This finding does not necessarily mean, however, that these countries
enjoyed access to additional funding during the crisis. Peek and Rosengren's analy-
sis does not distinguish between new capital inflows and the capitalization of past-
due interest. However, the data show that Japanese banks at least did not require
repayment of their outstanding loans.
7. It is worth noting that in several crises in the past, such as the Latin
American crisis of the 1980s and the Mexican crisis in 1994, well-established for-
eign banks had been willing to grant new loans to the crisis countries as late as a
few weeks or even days before the crisis started.Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises
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policymakers postpone financial integration until certain conditions
are met? And if so, what conditions?
What matters in addressing these questions is making a correct
diagnosis of the ultimate causes of overborrowing and overlending
—not an easy task, as the competing explanations of the Mexican and
Asian crises and their aftermaths make clear. Appropriate policy de-
sign with respect to foreign borrowing requires the precise identifica-
tion of the underlying market failure (Fernández-Arias and Montiel,
1996). One important market imperfection is moral hazard, which
can arise on either side of the international financial transaction,
due to explicit or implicit guarantees by domestic governments or
multilateral financial institutions (McKinnon and Pill, 1997; Dooley,
1997; Krugman, 1998; Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 1998). Here
the first-best solution is to remove those guarantees or make bor-
rowers pay for them at their market or shadow values. If that is not
possible, moral hazard may be controlled by adequate regulation and
supervision of banks, capital markets at large, and (as one of the
lessons of the Asian crisis) the corporate sector. If even that strategy
fails or cannot be implemented adequately, a third-best solution could
lie in the adoption of barriers to financial integration.
Eduardo Fernández-Arias and Davide Lombardo, in this volume,
extend the earlier literature on sovereign debt and risk,8 as well as
the more recent work on multiple equilibria, as an explanation of the
Asian crisis.9 They develop two models of market imperfections in
international capital flows that could lead to multiple equilibria through
the existence of country risk. In the first model, private sector over-
borrowing occurs when borrowing approaches or exceeds an effective
country credit ceiling, which in turn arises because there are no cred-
ible mechanisms to enforce international debt contracts against the
will of a sovereign debtor country. However, overborrowing (and any
accompanying overconsumption) can be ameliorated by adequate fis-
cal and trade policies. In the second model, financial fragility is based
on investors' self-validating loss of confidence in the debtor country's
prospects. If a massive withdrawal of foreign credit adversely affects
repayment by domestic debtors (for example, because of a real de-
valuation that makes debt repayment by firms in the nontradable
goods sector too expensive), then the market allocation biases the
8. See Harberger (1980), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981, 1989), and Bulow and
Rogoff (1989), among others.
9. See Calvo (1998), Sachs and Radelet (1998), among others.Leonardo Hernández and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
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composition of debt away from long-term and toward short-term debt.
This case could justify the adoption of controls or taxes on short-term
capital inflows, such as the selective reserve requirement on gross
capital inflows adopted by Chile during 1991-98. Alternatively, debtor
countries could contract with a foreign entity to provide a line of
credit to be drawn upon in the event of a liquidity crisis; Argentina
entered into such an arrangement after the 1994 Mexican crisis.
Hence, although overborrowing is a valid concern, policymakers need
to clearly identify its underlying causes and the optimal policy re-
sponse before imposing restrictions on financial integration.
4.4  Controls on Capital Inflows
Some emerging market countries (including Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, and Malaysia) resorted to temporary controls on capital inflows
during the long spell of large inflows in the 1990s, and Malaysia im-
posed temporary controls on outflows after the 1997 Asian crisis.
Among these experiences, Chile's selective controls on capital inflows
during 1991-98 provide a unique experiment for testing the effective-
ness and assessing the costs and benefits of limiting financial inte-
gration.10 The reasons why Chile's case is illuminating are partly
institutional (the tax-equivalent design of the controls and the rela-
tively high degree of compliance) and partly empirical (the relatively
high quality, frequency, and variability of the data on controls and
related economic variables). Francisco Gallego, Leonardo Hernández,
and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, in this volume, extend the previous em-
pirical literature on the Chilean experience,11 by testing for the de-
terminants and effects of capital controls in Chile, using monthly data
for 1989-2000.
The results show that capital controls  had some effect by in-
creasing the wedge between domestic and foreign interest rates,
10. In September 1998 the Central Bank of Chile suspended application of its
one-year unremunerated reserve requirement on selective (mostly financial and
short-term) capital inflows by lowering the rate to zero. In May 2000 it abolished
the one-year permanence requirement on foreign investment. Final full abolition
of the unremunerated reserve requirement on inflows, as well as of all other
remaining administrative controls on both inflows and outflows, took place in
April 2001.
11. See Soto and Valdés-Prieto (1996), Soto (1997),  Eyzaguirre and Schmidt-
Hebbel (1997), Le Fort and Sanhueza (1997), Laurens and Cardoso (1998), Nadal
De-Simone and Sorsa (1999), Valdés-Prieto and Soto (1998), De Gregorio and
others (1999), Herrera and Valdés (2001), and Larraín (2000).Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises
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marginally reducing aggregate net capital inflows, and changing the
composition of external debt toward longer maturities, without sig-
nificantly altering the real exchange rate. Part of this effect is tempo-
rary, however, as the effectiveness of controls is eroded over time.
Controls may have been important in contributing to Chile's rela-
tively low level of outstanding short-term foreign liabilities at the
time of the 1997-98 international financial turmoil. On the other hand,
the temporary macroeconomic benefits of capital controls could be
more than offset by reduced growth and more limited international
portfolio diversification, raising concern about their efficiency.
4.5  International Financial Crises
Four years after the outbreak of the East Asian crisis, experts
still disagree about its roots. A region that had been considered a
paradigm of successful development suddenly found itself mired in
financial collapse and deep recession in 1997-98. By contrast, most of
Latin America managed to avoid crisis in 1997-2000, in spite of rela-
tively poor macroeconomic management.
Roberto Chang and Andrés Velasco, in this volume, dispute the
relevance of ad hoc institutional and political explanations for the
Asian crisis, arguing instead that all the elements of a conventional
international financial crisis were present in Asia, just as they had
been in the Latin American debt crisis of 1982-85 and the Mexican
crisis of 1994-95.12 They claim that the main trigger of a crisis is
international illiquidity, that is, loss of access to additional foreign
borrowing by a country subject to significant currency and maturity
mismatches of its assets and liabilities. Such mismatches are often
the consequence of earlier domestic and external financial liberaliza-
tion that has allowed the accumulation of short-term foreign cur-
rency liabilities by domestic residents, whose income is largely de-
nominated in national currency. Illiquidity hits when capital inflows
turn to outflows in response to an adverse domestic or external
shock; the results are a banking crisis, a currency (or balance of pay-
ments) crisis, a recession, or some mix of the three. Moreover, the
12. Previous work on financial crises includes Díaz-Alejandro (1985), Velasco
(1987), Calvo (1995, 1996), Goldfajn and Valdés (1997), Frankel and Rose (1996),
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996a,b), Sachs (1997),
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998), and Chang and Velasco (2000), among
others.Leonardo Hernández and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
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punishment meted out by the market is typically disproportionate to
the country's sins, leading to severe international illiquidity, a col-
lapse of domestic asset prices and the real exchange rate as a result
of fire sales, and deep recession. The authors provide evidence that
these factors were present in East Asia in 1997, but much less preva-
lent in Latin America in the late 1990s, which could explain why that
region largely escaped the crisis.13
4.6  Contagion and an International Safety Net
A serious concern for policymakers in emerging market econo-
mies is financial contagion, that is, the possibility of liquidity prob-
lems—and a currency crisis—spreading from one country to another
despite strong fundamentals in the latter. This situation arises when
shocks in one or a few countries cause world capital markets to over-
react by restricting access to, and withdrawing funds from, emerging
market economies as a group.
It is important to stress the difference between real and pure
contagion. When contagion is real, meaning that the external shock
is indeed related to a deterioration in fundamentals,14 the only pos-
sible response is to adjust fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate poli-
cies accordingly—and the sooner the better. Furthermore, the best
way to reduce exposure to these shocks is by achieving wide diversi-
fication of both income and funding sources. Hence, in order to reduce
the likelihood of real contagion, countries should accelerate their eco-
nomic and financial integration, not slow it down.
Much as domestic financial systems are subject to bank runs and
panics, pure contagion across countries can occur because of asym-
metric information, "animal spirits," and multiple equilibria. Also like
bank runs and panics, episodes of pure contagion can impose heavy
deadweight costs on the affected countries. To avoid bank runs, many
countries have developed safety nets as discussed above. In world
capital markets, however, such mechanisms are missing, and until
they are put in place, countries are understandably reluctant to pro-
ceed to full financial integration. All parties could potentially gain
13. The obvious exceptions are the Brazilian crisis of 1998-99 and the near
crises in Argentina and Ecuador in 2000-01, which were avoided by the massive
provision of liquidity by multilateral financial institutions.
14. For instance, when a devaluation in one country translates into a loss of
international competitiveness by its trading partners and competitors.Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises
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from creating an international safety net or similar mechanisms
to reduce the chances of pure contagion. This would foster financial
integration, allowing developing countries to benefit from lower fund-
ing costs and greater access to new financial instruments, and pro-
viding industrial countries higher returns on their capital as well as
worldwide portfolio diversification.
Creating an international safety net is a complex undertaking.
Like safety nets in individual countries, an effective international
safety net needs to strike a balance among regulation, market forces,
and incentives. Because the operation of such a safety net will re-
quire sizable resources, most likely it will need the concurrence of
industrial-country governments, multilateral financial institutions,
and the private sector. The discussion regarding a "new international
financial architecture," which started after the 1994
Mexican crisis and continues today, and the difficulties encountered
by the Contingent Credit Line (CCL) facility of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), demonstrate the complexities of the task at
hand.15
 As in individual countries, an effective international safety net
would have to rely on market-friendly instruments to guarantee that
it keeps pace with a quickly changing market environment. In recent
years a few countries have put in place mechanisms aimed at ad-
dressing contagion, all of which are based on market signals as a
means to enhance market discipline. As mentioned above, Argentina
has contracted a credit line with a consortium of fourteen interna-
tional banks. The banks provide insurance against liquidity crises in
exchange for a fee, which is determined by the performance of the
Argentinean economy and especially its banks. As a vehicle for crisis
resolution, this private arrangement resembles lending of last resort
by an international central bank. However, Gavin and Powell (1998)
show that under certain assumptions the private credit line is supe-
rior, mainly because it imposes greater ex ante market discipline.16
Another example is that of New Zealand, which has significantly
upgraded the disclosure requirements imposed on banks and, as al-
ready mentioned, has fully opened its domestic financial markets to
15. The CCL was launched in 2000 but no eligible countries have yet sub-
scribed, mostly because of the perception that to do so would signal weak funda-
mentals in the subscribing country and thus turn market sentiment against it.
16. Although this issue requires further research, this advantage probably
explains the relative success of the Argentinean arrangement compared with the
CCL.Leonardo Hernández and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
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well-established international banks. This approach has boosted mar-
ket competition and self-regulation.17
5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
What have been the consequences of the financial turmoil
of 1997-98, and what lessons have we learned? What policy recom-
mendations can be offered, and what best practices proposed,
to emerging market economies seeking greater integration into the
world economy? In this final section we first discuss the
consequences and lessons arising from the recent crisis period, and
then address the somewhat risky task of advancing policy
recommendations.
5.1  Lessons from the Turmoil
We see four main consequences and corresponding lessons emerg-
ing from the recent crisis episode. First, there has been a revision—
even a questioning—of the net benefits of financial integration. On
the up side, nothing has happened to overturn the conviction that
financial integration and internationalization of banking can bring
great benefits to emerging market economies. These benefits accrue
as a result of deeper, more sophisticated, and more efficient financial
systems that foster higher investment and faster growth.  Financial
integration not only reflects changes in policies and regulations but
is also the result of ongoing progress in communications and infor-
mation technology, which emerging market economies could not avoid
even if they wanted to. The only way that policymakers could isolate
their economies from exogenous technical progress in financial ser-
vices would be to resort to increasing restrictions, which would cause
large and growing efficiency losses in resource accumulation and al-
location. Therefore it is becoming ever more difficult and costly for
emerging market economies to oppose international financial inte-
gration.
However, financial integration also presents downside risks due
to capital market volatility. International markets, like their domes-
tic counterparts, are subject to sudden changes of sentiment and to
contagion, which can be particularly intense for developing countries.
17. Cordella and Levy-Yeyati (1998) present a theoretical analysis of how
these links work.Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises
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Thus policymakers in emerging market economies have to find ways
to achieve financial integration while minimizing the downside risks.
Here it is important to note that other risks—often and wrongly blamed
on the process of financial integration itself, such as credit booms
and asset price bubbles—are more likely caused by domestic distor-
tions and policy failures. Similarly, foreign overborrowing and asset-
liability mismatches—often observed in countries that open their
capital accounts—are usually the result of inadequate domestic poli-
cies. These cases call for correcting the distortions and improving
policies at home, not reversing the process of financial integration
itself, which would only make matters worse in the long run by squan-
dering the opportunity to develop more quickly.
Second, it became clear after the Thai crisis that the interna-
tional financial system is subject to systemic shocks. The 1997 Thai
and 1999 Brazilian devaluations, and particularly the 1998 Russian
moratorium, showed that shocks in one country could quickly spread
across markets and economies, affecting seemingly unrelated emerg-
ing market economies and established industrial countries alike.
Furthermore, compared with previous crises, the punishment that
markets administered to many economies in the late 1990s seemed
out of proportion to the countries' sins. Markets worldwide reacted
very harshly even toward those countries with sound macroeconomic
fundamentals (Calvo, 1997).
Here the lessons to be drawn are twofold. First, maintaining strong
macroeconomic fundamentals is a necessary but not a sufficient con-
dition to avoid crises and contagion effects. After all, until 1997 the
Asian crisis countries boasted low inflation and sustained fiscal sur-
pluses, relatively small current account deficits (with the exception
of Thailand), high saving and investment rates, a large export base,
and little overvaluation of their currencies. Second, and more impor-
tant, contagion is a real threat that may affect emerging market econo-
mies and developed countries alike irrespective of their macroeco-
nomic fundamentals.
The third main lesson emerges from the Thai crisis in particular.
It is that the East Asian countries, which had been depicted as
examples of success because of their sound and prudent macroeco-
nomic policies,18 remained just as vulnerable to changes in market
sentiment as other economies following different development and
18. See World Bank (1993).Leonardo Hernández and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
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growth strategies. It could be argued that the ultimate determinant
of the crises in the East Asian countries was neither their large capi-
tal inflows nor their export-led growth strategies, but rather their
unsound financial systems and inadequate regulatory frameworks and
business environments. The crises brought these deficiencies of the
financial and the corporate sectors into the open.
Countries need to address structural deficiencies like these ei-
ther before they undertake financial integration or in tandem with it.
However, as the East Asian episode has shown, in many cases these
weaknesses do not surface until the domestic financial system is put
under strain from increasing financial intermediation and large capi-
tal inflows. Thus financial integration should become the trigger of
much-needed reform in the financial and corporate sectors in devel-
oping countries. The internationalization of banking can help by up-
grading banking technology and management and improving corpo-
rate governance in both the banking and the corporate sectors. But
to argue that the process of financial integration is at the root of all
the problems that developing countries have suffered, and to con-
clude from there that policies should be adopted that hinder this pro-
cess, is misguided. Putting sand into the gears of financial integra-
tion will only produce slower growth and a weaker and more vulner-
able economy in the long run.
The final lesson: the Asian crisis showed that the measures taken
after the Mexican crisis were inadequate to prevent another episode
of international financial turmoil.19 Since the Thai crisis in 1997, sev-
eral additional measures have been proposed to reduce the frequency
and severity of worldwide financial crises. All of these proposals ac-
knowledge the need to redesign the international financial architec-
ture to reduce contagion, and to build additional buffers to allow coun-
tries to accommodate shocks more easily. The proposals range from
establishing both an international bankruptcy court and a lender of
last resort, to abolishing multilateral financial institutions such as
the IMF, to imposing Tobin taxes on the free movement of capital
across countries to reduce market volatility (for a summary see
Eichengreen, 1999). Considering the complexities, both political and
19. After the Mexican crisis of 1994, the international financial community,
led by the IMF, introduced new guidelines for the production and dissemination of
macroeconomic and financial data, applicable to all countries participating in in-
ternational capital markets. These measures were prompted by international in-
vestors' complaints that publicly available data for Mexico before and during the
1994-95 tequila crisis had been inadequate and insufficient.Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises
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technical, involved in such a process, it is unlikely that a comprehen-
sive new global institutional framework governing international fi-
nancial transactions will be put in place in the near future. It is more
likely that, for the foreseeable future, most remedies to crises and
contagion will still be applied at the level of individual countries.
5.2  Policy Recommendations
We have argued that financial crises are due mainly to weak do-
mestic financial institutions, not to the joint occurrence of
external shocks and financial integration. This does not imply
that foreign shocks and contagion effects can be ignored, for
in fact they are more likely to occur in more integrated countries.
However, the transmission effect of foreign shocks to the domestic
economy depends critically on a country's macroeconomic
fundamentals and the strength and resilience of its financial
institutions.
Three recent examples illustrate this point. First, the Asian cri-
sis proved to be only a passing storm in Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong
Kong; all of these economies have strong fundamentals and sound
banks. Second, the Chilean banking system was fully restructured
and strengthened after the banking crisis of the early 1980s. As a
result, Chile was only mildly affected by the 1997-98 turmoil, although
it did suffer large terms-of-trade losses and capital inflow reductions.
Third, the Argentinean banking system was also restructured and
strengthened following the Mexican crisis of 1994. As a result, that
country was much less affected during the turmoil of 1997-98 than
during the Mexican crisis.
Hence the most important policy lesson that emerges is that fi-
nancial liberalization should proceed with caution but should
include the upgrade or overhaul of the entire regulatory and supervi-
sory framework for banks and a revision of corporate law. This is
important because financial liberalization can easily exacerbate moral
hazard and adverse selection in the financial sector and in its interac-
tion with the corporate sector. Ignoring these institutional aspects in
a liberalizing economy may, instead of pointing it toward higher in-
vestment and growth, only sow the seeds of future financial crises
and recessions.
Second, because implementing a successful financial liberaliza-
tion is a difficult and lengthy process, developing countries could
consider the use—as a temporary, second-best instrument—of toolsLeonardo Hernández and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
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aimed at reducing excess reliance on short-term debt, both domestic
and foreign. However, these policies, like Chile's selective controls
on capital inflows, should only be considered temporary and must be
properly designed and implemented so that a reasonable degree of
compliance can be attained. These instruments should be abolished
in the medium term (as Chile did) when financial markets have reached
a certain level of maturity and depth. By then the economy will have
developed adequate instruments to cope with maturity risks and ex-
change rate risks as well as the risk of a sudden reversal in capital
inflows due to international contagion.
Third, provided they have in place a credible nominal anchor for
the conduct of monetary policy within a consistent set of macroeco-
nomic policies, countries seeking greater financial integration should
consider adopting a flexible exchange rate regime.20 Floating could
reduce exposure to short-term debt because market participants would
then face greater exchange rate risk. But it will work only if there
are no other imperfections in place such as an implicit guarantee on
foreign debt that causes overexposure in the first place. At the same
time, floating could ease relative price adjustment when short-term
nominal price and wage rigidities are pervasive, allowing for rapid
nominal and real devaluation.
Fourth, developing countries should focus in the short term on
strengthening their banking systems. This includes measures like
making banks more resilient by raising capitalization requirements,
classifying their loan portfolios according to quality, building up pro-
visions against loan losses, and assessing maturity and exchange rate
mismatches. Even if the institutional changes just mentioned take
some time to be implemented, there is an urgent need to build up
buffers, and nowhere are buffers as important as in the domestic
banking system. One way to advance quickly in this regard is by open-
ing the domestic market to well-established foreign banks, comple-
mented by a large buffer stock of international reserves. Countries
like Chile and Singapore that fared relatively well during the recent
turmoil held large foreign reserves at the outset of the crisis. Such
buffers are expensive but may prove worth the cost while financial
integration proceeds, and while other institutional issues are being
addressed, by avoiding the much higher costs of a crisis.
20. An increasingly popular nominal anchor on which to base a monetary
regime is inflation targeting, pursued in combination with floating exchange rates.
See Loayza and Soto (2001), and the papers therein, for a review of a decade of
experience with inflation targeting in the world.Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises
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Fifth, even countries that are fully integrated into the world
economy can be affected by domestic and external shocks and suffer a
sudden (if temporary) loss of market confidence and large reversals
in capital flows. However, this does not mean that countries should
seek to protect themselves from these shocks by closing their econo-
mies. On the contrary, developing and industrial countries alike need
to implement policies aimed at achieving greater diversification of
both exports and funding sources (to the extent that contagion is
driven by international trade and financial links). Every emerging
market country also needs to initiate and sustain a comprehensive
communication strategy aimed at keeping markets fully informed of
its economic fundamentals, policies, and most recent developments.
To the extent that contagion results from information asymmetries
and from herd behavior, such a strategy should be of value in ward-
ing it off. Countries should also consider following Argentina's ex-
ample in arranging for liquidity insurance mechanisms.
Finally, countries should put in place mechanisms that ensure
prompt action in resolving a crisis should one occur. Good tools for
diagnosing the situation are critically needed at an early stage. In
many crisis episodes, both diagnoses and remedial actions prove in-
sufficient, requiring drastic subsequent revision and giving rise to
opportunistic behavior on the part of viable borrowers. For example,
in many country episodes a large initial devaluation (aimed at restor-
ing export competitiveness) occurred after the crisis hit. The devalu-
ation raised the cost of servicing foreign debt and posed a severe
financial problem. In countries that failed to address the financial
problem promptly, but instead postponed the difficult task of seizing
assets and allocating losses among different stakeholders, the initial
difficulties worsened existing moral hazard problems. This further
aggravated credit rationing and liquidity squeezes and led to a deeper
contraction in output and more serious financial problems.21 Also,
a rapid recovery was hindered in some countries by tight monetary
and fiscal policies early on, aimed at containing inflationary pres-
sures arising from the devaluations.22
21. For an anatomy of financial crises see Mishkin (1997).
22. This is a debatable point on which not all observers agree. See Radelet and
Sachs (1998) and Sachs and Radelet (1998).Leonardo Hernández and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel
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